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### RESEARCH ARTICLE

#### I AND THE LOOK OF THE OTHER: AN EXISTENTIAL CRITIQUE

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#### Abstract

Sigmund Freud in one of his most influential books Civilization and its Discontents points out that the individual must face three types of dangers: disease of the body, natural calamities from the external physical environment and the hostility of persons. Through the advanced medical science and the development of modern technology, the first two dangers have lost much of their terror. But dangers from the hostility of other persons have not decreased. The question then becomes: has this danger not decreased because men are yet unsuccessful in finding a way of reducing it or because the nature of man is such that the danger cannot conceivably be reduced? Jean Paul Sartre an existentialist sees the harmonious interpersonal relationships are impossible because of the very nature of the human condition. This work therefore is geared towards expounding the absurdity of inter-subjectivity in the philosophy of this French atheistic existentialist. The main discourse is on the alienation of the self. As to what alienates the self, Sartre would readily say "the look of the Other." The discussion therefore centers on how the look of the other influences the self as Sartre conceived it. He had asserted that human communion of any sort is an illusion. The work will expound his attempt to explain love as one of the modes of human relation through a critical existential method.

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#### Introduction:-

Sartre's work on the phenomenological study of the "Other" is very remarkable. For him the awareness of Others is inseparable from the shock of the encounter with what he describes as a freedom, an alien freedom, which is adverse and threatening. For him subjective reactions to this form of aggression are in the first place fear. And secondly pride or shame. Fear and shame are for him the two proper and immediate reactions to the intrusion of another person into my world.

In interpersonal relationships Sartre regards each human being as the inevitable and natural enemy of his fellow man. For him all relations between me and another are a battle to the death. Either he transcends my transcendence and makes a thing of me or I transcend and so make a thing of him. That is how the conflict looks and it never ends in victory for one or the other.

The distinctiveness of Sartre's position is that he does not merely regard conflict as a necessary element in human relations but rather makes it the foundation of human relations. In all Sartre holds conflict to be the essence of human relations. In Sartre's interpersonal relationships who is the other? What is the other's influence on the self?

What relations exist between me and the other? How does the look of the other affect me in the inter-subjectivity of my being?

The hostility of persons in the society is inevitable according to Sartre. The dangers from hostility of other persons have not diminished even in the so-called advanced industrial societies. The question then becomes: why has this danger not being eliminated, is it because men are yet unsuccessful in finding a way of dealing with it or is it because the nature of man is such that the danger cannot conceivably be reduced. For Sartre harmonious interpersonal relationships are impossible because of the very nature of the human condition.

This work on the absurdity of inter-subjectivity in Sartre is very important if we must have a holistic look at conflict resolution in our society. The illusion of this interpersonal relationship in Sartre's existentialism seems to be the problem of man. As such this essay will contribute to growing literature on the inter-subjectivity of the human person. It will also give some insight in seeking for appropriate means of enhancing personal relationships.

The method adopted in this work is expository in the work *Being and Nothingness* and other related works. This will entail textual analysis of the phenomenology of the other and other related issues to this theme. In this analysis Sartre will speak for himself when we quote directly from his works.

### **Alienation of the Self**

Jean Paul Sartre in his work *Being and Nothingness*<sup>283</sup> believes that it is the Other's looking at me that reveals the existence of another subject. The relation between persons is essentially an affair of disconnection and conflict. He argues that it cannot be proved by analogical arguments or otherwise that there are other selves rather it is the case that my own apprehension of myself is so structured that it presupposes the existence of other conscious beings. He posits the existence of the other not in the total communication of love but in the phenomenology of 'shame' and the power of the other is attested not by the warmth of his benevolent gaze but by the annihilating and alienating malevolence of his "look."

### **Understanding the Concept of the Other**

To express the idea of objective being Sartre coined the term "Being-in-itself" and to express the idea of the subjective individual he used the term "Being-for-itself". The Being-in-itself is simply the thing in the sheer irreducibility of its thingness. It is the term which Sartre used to speak of the mute, voiceless impassivity with which the world stares at man. Thus he holds that the being of things is as described by M. J. Walsh in *A History of Philosophy* '... rigid, immobile, deterministic and already complete in itself. Devoid of potency and becoming it simply is. It is absolutely contingent wholly given and without any reason for its being' (Walsh, 1985).

It is neither passive nor active neither an affirmation nor a negation. Contrary to "being-in-itself, "being-for-itself is forever fluid, incomplete, vacuous and lacking in determinate structure. It is Sartre's term for man. He speaks of man as the creature who is "for" himself because he thinks of man as the creature whose existence is forever in question. For him man's nature is not definitely established and immovably fixed. And since everything which is existing must be a thing in itself Sartre attests in the words of Walsh that "this different type of being, being-for-itself can only be not thing-in-itself. It is therefore non-being, nothingness" (Walsh, 1985). Thus human being, being for himself consists in nothing.

A basic distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself is that the former is, whereas being-for-itself is not. The being-for-itself is not independent. It is a non-substantial absolute. It depends on the in-itself. It is for that reason always uncertain: its being is never established but always sought after; being-in-itself and being-for-itself are two modes of being. Sartre sees the being-for-itself apart from the being-in-itself as a kind of abstraction that could not exist anymore than a color could exist without form or sound without pitch and timbre. Being as a unity consisting of in-itself and for-itself is an ideal being.

Again he devotes much of his writings to a detailed analysis and a description of a third category which he calls "Being-for-others." The Other is a consciousness a personal being like me. He is the one who excludes me by being himself. The other is free exactly as I am free. He is at present what I make myself not be. The other is the one who looks at me and the being at whom I am not looking. The moment I look at him he becomes a part of the world and loses the structure that characterizes him as the Other. Conclusively the other is boundless, endless, incomprehensible subjectivity. He is in addition unbounded freedom.

**“Me” and the “Other”**

Among the existent beings of the world external to me there is a category altogether apart beings endowed with consciousness like myself, my kind. At first sight, these my kinds are objects like any others like a tree, a rock, a monument and so on. It is true that at least one of the modalities of the Other's presence to me is objectness.

Sartre argues that if this relation of objectness is the fundamental relation between the other and myself then the other's existence remains purely conjectural. That it is not only conjectural but probable that the voice which I hear is that of a man and not a song on a phonograph. It is infinitely probable that the cyclist who is carrying me is a man and not a perfected robot. This means that without going beyond the limits of probability and because of this very probability, my apprehension of the other as an object essentially refers me to a fundamental apprehension of the other in which he will not be revealed to me as an object but as a “presence in person.” He maintains that the other is an absolutely essential condition for the very existence of for-itself.

Hence W. Kaufmann in the work *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* says thus ‘when we say “I think” we are attaining to ourselves in the presence of the Other and we are just as certain of the Other as we are of ourselves. Thus the man who discovers himself directly in the cogito also discovers all the others and discovers them as the condition of his own existence. He recognizes that he cannot be anything (in the sense in which one says one is spiritual or that one is wicked or jealous) unless Other recognize him as such’ (Kaufmann, 1956).

The original relation of myself to the Other is not only an absent truth aimed at the concrete presence of an object in my universe but also a concrete daily relation which at each instance I experience. There is in everyday reality an original relation to the other which can be constantly pointed to and which consequently can be revealed to me outside all reference to a religious or mystic “unknowable.” The Other is indispensable to my existence and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself.

In shame, the phenomenon of the Other confronts me. That I am ashamed implies that I am conscious of myself as being looked at. Shame is therefore possible only through the Other. As Levi William in *Philosophy and the Modern Man* would say ‘the Other is the indispensable creator of my “Objectness” for my shame is by nature the recognition that I am as the other sees me’ (William, 1959). The Other sees me in a way that I cannot see myself.

If shame is shame of oneself before the Other then it is clear that I need the Other to realize fully the various aspects of my being. And in turn I must therefore admit that the Other is a real existent being, independent of my existence and possessing the same intrinsic freedom and subjectivity which I experience directly in myself. If the other were nothing other than an object his existence would be purely probable and would be subject to validation. But this existence requires no validation.

If in general there is an Other, it is necessary above all that I be the one who is not the Other and it is in this very negation effected by me upon myself that I make myself be and that the Other arises as the other. The Other becomes then that which I make myself not-be. Thus the Other whom I recognize in order to refuse to be him is before alleles the one for whom my for-itself is. Not only do I make myself not be this other being by denying that he is me, I make myself not be a being who is making himself not-be me.

Being-for-others is a constant fact of my human reality and I grasp it with its factual necessity in every thought however slight which I form concerning myself, for in Being and Nothingness: ‘Wherever I go whatever I do, I only succeed in changing the distances between me and the other as objects only avail myself of paths towards Other. To withdraw to approach ... is to effect empirical variations on the fundamental theme of my being-for-others’ (Sartre, 1966).

Thus my being-for-others is not an image cut off from me and growing in a strange consciousness. It is a perfect being, my being as the condition of selfness confronting the Other and of the Other's selfness confronting me. It is possible for me to deny that the Other is me only in so far as the Other is himself a subject.

In fact, nothing can limit me except the Other. He appears as the one who in his full freedom and in his free projection toward his possibilities puts me out of play and strips me of my transcendences. Wahl writes the existence of the Other is my negation. It endangers me. By the attention which it places on me and which reduces

me right in my heart, the Other attempts to fix and freeze my destiny for all time. Under the attention of the Other, I am reduced to being only a thing, to being only a means of an obstacle for the realization of the projects of the Other. It would be necessary for me to escape the attention of the Other. It would be necessary for me to escape the attention of the Other but this is impossible (Wahl, 1949).

Thus, I am in the eye of the Other, an object not merely of perception but also of appraisal.

The Other is free to judge me and can label and type cast me in some roles not of my choosing. Though this act of appraisal is reciprocal, paying him in his own coin does not alleviate the danger for me. On the other hand, being simply what he says I am, so as to shuffle off my responsibility for what I am is what Sartre calls 'Bad Faith'. In this situation therefore the only way out is to try to destroy the freedom of the Other by making a thing of him. But to treat him as an object cannot be entirely successful for the Other is objectively free for example to make what appraisal he likes of me.

It is the body which is the focus of this alienation. This is quite logical because it is first and foremost my body upon which the Other fixes when he looks at me. It is in virtue of being and having a body that the existent is in the World. Likewise my being-with-others is possible only through my being or having a body.

### **The "Body" and the "Other"**

Ordinarily, I am aware of the Other because I touch him, see him, hear him through the organs of sensation. I communicate with him through the medium of language, which is made possible by those bodily organs. However, Sartre argues that the body is not that which manifests the Other to me. It is not a screen between ourselves and things. I must apprehend the Other first as the one for whom I exist as an object.

The appearance of the Other is not therefore for him the primary encounter, it is rather only one episode in my relations with the Other. The Other therefore exists for me first and I apprehend him in his body subsequently. The Other's body is for me secondary. He makes two acute observations concerning the way in which I perceive the body of the Other. The first is that I can never apprehend the Other's body except in terms of a total situation which indicates it. A room with various fittings for example is structured with a view to bodily existence so the body is seen in relation to the world, not as an item in the world but as world user. The second point is that I cannot perceive any organ of the Other's body in isolation and I always cause each single organ to be indicated to me in terms of the totality of the flesh or of life. We do not for example perceive a walking foot but a man walking. Sartre therefore claims that my perception of the Other's body is radically different from my perception of things.

Consequently, he asserts that the body only manifests individuality and contingency of our original relation to instrumental things. In using my eyes for example to see with is going beyond them towards what I see. In this case I am the other in relation to my eyes. This refers to the fact that when I use my eyes I am not conscious of my eyes but only of what falls within my field of vision.

Sartre considers the body as existing in three dimensions. First, he sees my body as it is lived by me that is as the subjectively experienced center of perception and action. Secondly, he considers my body as it is utilized and known by the other. And lastly, he considers my as it is experienced by me as body known by the other. It is in connection with the third of these dimensions that Sartre speaks of alienation.

Thus Richard Schacht in his work *Alienation* comments "my body when I experience it as something known by the Other is something alien to me for it is radically different from my body as I subjectively experience it ..." (Schacht, 1970). The Other's body is radically different from my body-for-me, it is tool which I am not and which I utilize. The body-for-me is both the centre of reference indicated by the serviceable things organized in the world and the contingency lived by the pour-soi. The parlour in which I wait for the master of the house reveals to me in its totality his body.

Accordingly, Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* notes: This easy chair is a chair-where-he-sits, this desk is a desk-at-which-he-writes.... Thus it is an outline complete with all its parts and this outline is an outline-of-an-object; an object can come at every instant to fill the outline with content. But still the master of the house "is not there" (Sartre, 1966).

Absence therefore is a structure of being-there. To be absent is to-be-elsewhere-in-the-world. It is to be already given for me.

### **The Look of the Other**

Sartre conceives the relation between persons to be essentially an affair of disconnection and conflict. And he argues that its central reality is what he calls the "look". In other words, I do not begin to exist for another until he looks at me; nor does he come into my field of attention until I look at him, for it is the fact of another's looking at me that reveals the existence of another subject. And when he does look at me something happens within me which is different from what happens when I confront a thing. By this look, the other person enters into my field as a counter perspective challenging my perspectives.

For me, the Other is first the being for whom I am an object, a being through whom I gain my objectness. Since I am an object for him, he has his own methods of assessing my probable behavior. I am things-like in his eyes and things cannot make promises. For him I have no possibility of my own making. I am a thing which may or may not behave in the way I say I will. My promises are only a special kind of predictions and may be falsified as well as any other.

The Other's look is the necessary condition of my objectivity for me. The Other's look touches me across the world and is not only a transformation of myself but a total metamorphosis of the world. I am a thing no longer exclusively the object I have been for myself, the object I call my ego and in whose interest, I, as a subject, operates in the world. I am additionally the object I represent for him as he is the object he represents for me. I feel myself entering into his frame of reference as an object related to his interests. There is at once something in it which in principle eludes me that is the other's thoughts.

Through the look I experience the Other concretely as a free, conscious subject who causes a world to be, by temporalizing himself towards his own possibilities. When I am seen, I am seen as an object in a world that is not mine and in which everything is ordered from the viewpoint of the Other. As an object in an alien world, I am alienated and the world which I have organized becomes alien to me. That subject's presence without intermediary is the necessary condition of all thought which I would attempt to form concerning myself.

In Sartre's philosophy the 'look' means more than a mere gaze. It is a stare with profound concentration, an inquiring look with a very deep imagination it is possessive. The anecdote is aimed at making us recollect the emotion of shame and fear as they are actually experienced. For Sartre the appearance of the Other in my world is the occasion for possibilities if not actual disruption of the world. Fear the natural reaction on my part to such a possibility would seem to be my original reaction to him in such circumstances. For Sartre therefore fear and shame are two proper and immediate reactions to the intrusion of 'the another'.

Shame indicates that I am ashamed of myself before the Other. The Other is another subject which is an absolutely independent being and which in no way depends on my thinking.

In every look there is the appearance of an Other-as-object as a concrete and probable presence in my field of perception. On the occasion of certain attitudes of that Other I determine myself to apprehend through shame, anguish and so forth my being looked at. Each look makes us prove concretely that we exist for all men.

To look at another person is immediately to make him the Other. It is to reduce him to the status of an object and thus to reduce his freedom. When the Other through his gaze reduces me to an object my reality begins to depend not on my own freedom but on his. And when I gaze at him his human reality becomes dependent on my freedom. The case becomes that I must get at the Other before he gets at me.

The Other must be looked at as a constant menace against whom war must be continuously waged because the Other represents a danger. The Other-as-object is an explosive instrument which I handle with care because I foresee the permanent possibility of him reversing the situation by looking at me. Therefore my constant concern is to contain the Other within his objectivity and to remain his master. It is such analysis of the 'I-Thou' relation that requires Sartre to deny that love is ever any simple possibility for human beings.

**Love as Mode of Interpersonal Relationships**

Every human being in Sartre's world qualifies as consciousness. Each consciousness is a subject which is a potential threat to every other subject. This means that every human being is the natural enemy of the other since he is determined to do everything in his power to make an object of the other.

Sartre contends that everything which may be said of me in relation with the Other applies to him as well. While I try to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine while I seek to enslave the Other, the other seeks to enslave me. He therefore contends that all human encounters must be viewed as a form of conflict.

On the basis of this situation and conflict, Sartre tries to explain the nature of the modes of human relations. In dealing with this, he considers seven modes of human relations love, language, masochism, indifference, desire, hate and sadism. Let us deal only with love.

**Love**

Love is one of the fundamental modes of man's being for others. The worth of love consists in influencing the Other's freedom while leaving that freedom intact. The notion of 'ownership' by which love is often explained is not actually primary. Sartre argues that if love were to be explained in terms of 'ownership', lovers might often be satisfied. But the reason why the lover wishes to possess his loved is that he is in a sense created by the Other. It is the Other's freedom which the lover wants to possess. Of course what the lover wants is a contradiction and so he can never be satisfied for if he possess this freedom then his loved one would no longer be free.

What the lover seeks is to have the beloved voluntarily curtail her in order to serve him, to become a fixed quantity for him and to avoid resembling a robot by constantly remembering her consent to fulfill his function. Sartre goes on in *Being and Nothingness* to say: The tyrant scorns love, he is content with fear. If he seeks to win the love of his subject, it is for political reason and if he finds a more economical way to enslave them, he adopts it immediately on the other hand the man who wants to be loved does not desire the enslavement of the beloved. He is not bent on becoming the object of passion which flows forth mechanically (Sartre, 1966, 478)

The total enslavement of the beloved kills the love of the lover. The end is surpassed, if the beloved is transformed into an automaton the lover finds himself alone. Thus the lover does not desire to possess the beloved as one possesses a thing, he demands a special type of appropriation. He wants to possess freedom as freedom. The lover wants to be loved by a freedom not by a slave or an automaton, yet he longs at the same time for the freedom that loves him not to be free. He demands that freedom act as if it were fettered by love.

In any love I desire that another should will my existence thus enabling me to exist through him and giving me a justification for existence. In love, it is not a determinism of the passions which we desire in the Other nor a freedom beyond reach. It is a freedom which plays the role of a determinism of the passions and which is caught in its own role. In love, the lover wants to be 'the whole world' for the beloved. This means that he puts himself on the side of the world: He is the one who assumes and symbolizes the world, he is a 'this' which includes all other 'thises' .... It is in the capacity of an end already chosen that the lover wishes to be chosen as an end (Sartre, 1966). He does not want to set on the Other's freedom but to exist a priori as the objective limit of this freedom. nevertheless, if to love is to be loved, it is also to wish that the Other should wish us to love him.

The lover's chief motivation stems, of course, from his first experience with the beloved before she consented to live with him as the centre of existence. In the earlier moment she had fixed her gaze on him and made him feel he was an object. In wanting to become a value he wants to escape from that moment prove that he is not an object and thereby resume his subjectivity.

To want to be loved is to want to be placed beyond the whole system of values posited by the Other and to the condition of all valorization and the objective foundation of all values. In Sartre's opinion, my loving you is nothing more than my trying to make you love me. I try to force you my beloved to make me the limit and end-all of your life. At the same time, you, my beloved try to make me love you and make you the reason for my existence. As a result, we are faced here with an infinite regress and total frustration.

In the current terminology of love, the beloved is often called 'the chosen one'. The lover is irritated and feels himself cheapened when he thinks that the beloved has chosen him from among others. Then he would say so if I had not come for a picnic, you would never have known me and you would not have loved me. This thought grieves the lover, his love becomes one love among others and is limited by the beloved's facticity and by his own facticity as well as by the contingency of encounters.

William Barrett summarizes in the *Irrational Man*, Sartre's fundamental posture vis-à-vis the Other and human love. He writes to the other person who looks at me from the outside, I seem an object, a thing, my subjectivity with its inner freedom escapes his gaze. Hence his tendency is always to convert me into the object he sees.... It is this...into a perpetual tension and indeed warfare... (Barret, 1958). Thus the lovers embark upon a hopeless struggle each waiting wholly to limit the freedom of the Other and yet to be loved by someone who is still free.

A person cannot be free and at the same time not free. Yet this is what lovers demand. In love, even more than in any other relationship between two individuals, it is the freedom of the beloved that the lover wishes to appropriate. If love were only the physical possession of the Other's body, it would be easily satisfied. But Sartre argues that love as we know is much more. It is the freedom of that partner which is desired in love. Therefore the lover must seduce the beloved and his love can in no way be distinguished from the enterprise of seduction.

Love like human existence as a whole, is destined to continual frustration. The lover tries to become the absolute, the ultimate meaning of life for the beloved. Within this hopeless and repetitive struggle Sartre argues that there are only three possible patterns of behavior. A lover may either become a sadist and seeks to appropriate the Other completely by violence, or he may become a masochist and consent to be nothing but a thing, or he may adopt the attitude of indifference which amounts to evading the conflict altogether.

### **Evaluation**

Jean Paul Sartre is a contemporary thinker not only because of the period in which he wrote but also because his thought is essentially concerned with the problem of modern man. He attempts to come to terms with the human situation within the context of the intellectual climate of his time. It is mainly through the work of Sartre that existentialism has come to the attention of its wide international audience.

One of the points that terrify one in Sartre's analysis of the Other is how one can live authentically without his fellow human beings. In his system, there is really no contact possible among persons as such. They flee each other and exclude each other with a fatality which defines them. It is clear that Sartre's approach to the theory of existence of Others rests upon the complete denial of 'We' as subject.

Its whole tendency is to assert that human communication is doomed to failure. For him, the word communion has no meaning at any possible level. For him as Marcel G. discerns in the work *The Philosophy of Existentialism*: the sense of community...is only experienced on such occasions as when a regiment is marching in step or a gang of workmen is pulling together.... But when it comes to the genuine community, the community of love or friendship, Sartre's analysis reveals the fundamental agnosticism and even nihilism of his view (Marcel, 1956).

This is because in his universe participation itself is impossible, there is room only for appropriation. This in a case where appropriation is impracticable or if achieved fails of its object. Gabriel Marcel exemplifies this with the case of a man who succeeds in enslaving his wife. He believes that the woman becomes an instrument with which he can do what he wills. But the probable result is that this appropriation will destroy his love for her. And she will in turn lose all interest for him and the climax of success will prove to be the climax of failure.

But many would ask whether there is not an inconsistency in maintaining the importance of other persons in our lives while at the same time vigorously asserting that in the last analysis each of us stands alone and must as an individual bear full responsibility for his being.

Really there is no inconsistency in it. Individuality does not usually consist in living alone or in isolation from others. As Aristotle in *Politics* has documented '... whoever has no need of society or is unable to live in society is either a beast or a god' (1253a 28-30). The individualist therefore has to be defined by the manner in which he relates to others.

On the claim that conflict is a necessary feature of human reality, the pragmatists would neither affirm nor deny it. This is so because there are many types of conflicts. There are the avoidable conflicts and the unavoidable conflicts. Some conflicts are desirable and some are not. An example: friendly rivalry in a philosophical debate is a desirable form of conflict while on the other hand, warfare is an undesirable form of conflict but since Sartre failed to specify the conflict in question such claims of his that all human encounters must be viewed as a form of conflict cannot be wisely appraised and is consequently questionable.

On another note, Sartre did not choose the example of a man who looks through the keyhole and listens at the door by chance. The reason for its being chosen is evident. Eavesdropping is not an activity ordinarily pursued in public. If I indulge in it, I expect to be alone. His instance therefore is true but it remains to be seen whether this is true of human existence as a whole. Neither his examples nor his object-subject theory suffices to prove the view that shame is the original expression of my relation to Others. They do not prove that I fundamentally and exclusively see myself as bodily nakedness before all Others as spectators. On the other hand, one can reasonably argue that the original relation of myself to another lies in the recognition of the Other like myself who enriches and completes my freedom rather than threatening to annihilate it.

Robert Olson in Introduction To Existentialism does not agree with Sartre that 'the look' is the basis for conflict between human beings. He holds that it is not a basic ontological fact from which all conflicts are derived and in terms of which conflict must be defined. In this connection, he aptly says a moment's reflection will reveal that we do not enter into conflict with one another because we look at one another. On the contrary it is because we conflict with one another that we look. We rarely look at passing strangers on the street but we do look closely at the man who is competing for a job we want ourselves. Contrariwise we are not conscious of being looked at by strangers in the street but we are acutely conscious of being observed by a rival (Olson, 1962).

The look is therefore not even an apt metaphor for conflict. Sartre is so committed to a view of the Other as enemy that whole ranges of experience are brushed aside the bond of love and fidelity between husband and wife, the affectionate tenderness in the relation between mother and child are thrown overboard. There is nothing particularly conflict-generating in for instance the look of an adoring mother.

### **Conclusion:-**

There is perhaps nothing more remarkable in the whole of Sartre's work than his phenomenological study of the 'Other'. For him, the awareness of Others is inseparable from the shock of the encounter with what he describes as a freedom, an alien freedom which is adverse and threatening. My subjective reactions to this form of aggression are in the first place fear and secondly pride or shame. Fear and shame are for him the two proper and immediate reactions to the intrusion of another person into my world. Unlike the theistic existentialists, Sartre regards each human being as the inevitable and natural enemy of his fellowman. For him, all relations between me and another are a battle to the death. Either he transcend my transcendence and makes a thing of me or I transcend and so make a thing of him. That is how the conflict looks and it never ends in victory for one or the other.

The distinctiveness of Sartre's position is that he does not merely regard conflict as a necessary element in human relations but rather makes it the foundation of human relations. Sartre holds conflicts to be the essence of human relations. As we have seen in the evaluation this position of Sartre in spite of its beautiful arguments and interesting reading remain grossly unsatisfactory.

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